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"Unions and the Employment Stability of Nonunion
Workers: A Sequential Logit Approach"
by
Lawrence M. Kahn and Klmio Morimune
Abstract
This paper uses 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity data to
estimate the union effect on nonunion employment stability, approximated
by a worker's number of spells of unemployment in 1966. A sequence
of logit functions is used to estimate the conditional probability of
continuing to each successive spell of unemplojrment. Unions are found
to substantially Increase the spells of unemployment for nonunion nonwhite
workers; effects on whites are found to be weak.
V'J
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I . Introduction
By causing a union-nonunion wage differential, unions can indirectly
lead to frequent eiriployment instability of nonunion workers, as well as
influence the latter 's wages. This possible effect is of Importance
for at least two reasons. First, it has been argued that racial differ-
ences in unemployment rates are primarily due to differences in frequency
2
rather than duration of unemployment (Flanagan, 1973). A study of
union impact on frequency of nonunion unemployment can shed light on
this determinant of racial differences. Second, firms are likely to
judge job applicants at least partly on the basis of their past employ-
ment records; therefore, unions can, through their effect on job
stability of nonunion workers, influence the latter' s probability of
being hired in desirable jobs. Further, opportunities for acquiring
firm-specific training depend on stability of employment. Thus, unions
can influence the future labor market success of nonunion v^?orkers, in
addition to current nonunion wages.
This paper uses 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and
labor market data to estimate the impact of unions on the employment
stability of nonunion t-jorkers. In the SEO, this variable is approxi-
mated by the number of spells (S) of unemployment in 1966 that an
Individual experienced. Since S is a discrete variable taking on one
of four possible values, estimation of its determinants requires a
limited dependent variable technique. A sequential logistic model is
therefore employed.
^•'- • Union and Nonunion Employment Stability
This section discusses a mechanism whereby unions increase non-
union job instability. In addition, possible race-sex differences in

the union impact on nonunion einploj'ment stability are explored.
The theoretical framework for analyzing the union effect on non-
union employment stahillty is based on Mincer's (1976) model of the
unemployment effects of mlniraum wage laws. Suppose that before unions
become organized, all workers earn a wage of W , Suppose unions then
organize a part of the economy and raise union wages to W >W
,
while
nonunion wages become VJ <V^ (W may be less than or greater than or° n u n -^ "
equal to W —Kahn, 1976) . The quantity of union labor demanded will
decline. If vjorkers are risk-neutral, then the union-nonunion wage
differential will cause frictional unemployment as nomuiion workers
"wait" for jobs in the union sector. For suppose the probability of
finding a nonunion job is 1, while that for a union job is p. Then
risk neutrality implies
:
pW = W
'^ u n
Suppose E is total employment, 6 is the separation rate in the
union sector and that vacancies are filled immediately. Then, follow-
ing Mincer (1976) , if there are still U unemployed job searchers after
the vacancies are filled, then,
6 E
1)
P U + 6 E
u
S - W
If VJ = -
—
—
, k = fraction of employment that is unionized, and
totaJ economv unemolovTnent ^, .^ . ., , ^. ^
li = r "
-
, then It IS easily snovrn that
'I total economy employment
2) Ug = k5W (Mincer, 1976).
Thus U is the volume of unemployment relative to employment that is
caused by the piesence of unions compared to the situation where k = 0.
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A related measure of uiiion impact is to assess
-yrrn the effect on U^
of an exogenous increase in k froin its present (positive) value. We
therefore have:
3) -^ = 6W + k5 f >
5
since both terms on the right hand side of 3) are positive. Thus an
increase in the degree of unionism in the economy leads to increasing
search unemployment among nonunion vjorkers.
Consideration of those industries that are most likely to increase
their degrees of unionism when labor laws become more pro-union rein-
forces the basic result. Since unions are most likely to organize stable
industries, an increase in k implies that the "typical^' nonunion
employee is more likely to be in an unstable job and to experience
involuntary unemployTnent
.
Equation 3) predicts a positive causal relationship from increased
union coverage to increased unemployment. Since unemployed workers
do not have unlimited resources and since capital markets are imperfect,
job searchers may be forced to temporarily take low-paying jobs before
8finding a more desirable one. Therefore, increases in K should lead
to both increasing frictional unemployment and to larger numbers of
spells of unemployment for nonunion v7orkcr3.
Unions can differentially affect the employment stability of non-
union workers in different race-sex groups through at least two
mechanisms. First, the union contribution to the level of unemploy-
ment may differ by race-sex groups. ' Second, given the level of unemploy-
ment, the expected incidence may differ across groups. These two possi-
bilities are discussed in turn. First, an increase in k can affect U^j
differentially If the race-sex groups perceive different returns to
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searching. This outcoTne may occur if the anticipated probability of
finding a union job and/or clie perceived wage increase from finding
oae differs by labor mtirket subgroup. In order to predict the effects
of uniouisiri on Ua by race-sex group, one must therefore devise a theory
to explain the formation of these perceptions. As an approximation to
such a theory, we will examine two polar cases:
i) Each race-sex group reacts only to outcomes facing that
group (k, o, W, --)
ii) Each race-sex group reacts only to outcomes for the entire
labor market
.
In reality, vjorkers in a given group ma^/ react both to changes
in conditions facing that group and in those facing other groups. How-
ever, some interesting findings result from the consideration of the two
dW
polar cases. In particular, in case i) , we must examine k, 5, W and —^
for each race-sex group.
Ashenfelter (I'^^'Z) has found that k is roughly 31-32% for black
and for while males and 12-13% for black and for white females. It
has been suggested that separation rates are larger for females than
males and blacks than v;hites (Barnes And Jones, 1974; Flanagan, 1973).
Finally, Ashenfelter (1972) has found the following ranking of W in
descending order: black malts, white males, white females, black
dWfemales. The authors know of no evidence on -^ by race-sex group.
dU,,
These findings suggest that 0.^ and ---^ should be higher for nonwhite
than white males. The theoreticaJ results for the other groups in case
i) are ambiguous because the rankings of k, 6 and VJ among them differ.
In case ii) , workers perceive neither different probabilities of find-
ing a union job nor different union wages. Thus, only the relationships
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among average union wages (for the labor market), the subgroups average
nonunion vjages, and k can explain differepxces in U and -y^- In the
SEO sample, average nonunion wages can be ranked by group in descending
order: white males, non-white males, white females, and nonxv'hite females.
dU.^
Thus, case ii) implies that U and —.-r— should be less for ii?hite males
a diC
than the other groups. Consideration of these CvJ'o cases leads to the
following tentative conclusion. The impact of -anions on overall non-
union unemployment should be stronger for nonwhite males than for white
males
.
The second stage of the analysis of the union iiRpact on nonunion
spells of unemployraent by race-sex group involves differences in the
expected number of speJ.ls given the level of unemployment. A given
level of U probably results in more spells of unernplo^Tnent for non-
whites than whites because the liquidity constraint is more likely to
be binding for the foroier group. Because of this consideration and
in light of the analysis in cases i) and ii) above, the following hypoth-
esis Is suggested. Unionism is most likely to increase nonwhite male
spells of unemployment by more than those of wliite males and to increase
nonwhite female spells by more than those of white females.
Ill . Framework for Estimation
Because stability of employment is approximated by a discrete
variable, a qualitative dependent variable approach is suggested.
Spells of unemployment, S, takes on, four values: 0, 1, 2, and 3 (the
last value refers to ''3 or more" spells) . In order to analyze the
determinants of S, the following sequential process is assumed. By
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ciefinition, individuals begin each year with spells of mieiripLoyiaeTii:
for that year. Throughout the. course of tiie year, some workers experience
spells of unemployment, whiJe other.-i don't. Of tluse v/ho experienc;i
uneinpioyinent (i.e. S > 0), some liave only one spell, while otliers
become unemployed more than once (S > 1). Finiilly, of chose who liave
become uneiiiployed twice, some experience additional spells (S = 3),
vhile some do not (S = 2). Let X be a vector of M explanatory variablos^
Affieiaiya (1975) implies that such a process can be analyzed by estiiiiatlng
the following sequence of conditiona], probabilities:
^) %a) = P(S = \\
5) q.(X) = p(S =
Sequential probabilities q^,, q-, and q are analogous to transition
probr.bilities in Markov models. However, f artain transitions are
ruled out (e.g., the transition froia 2 to 1 spell of unemployment).
Using the calculated results for q-., a, and q,^ the iuipacc of unicnisra
on nonunion spells of unempi ovmeai can do astiaatt/a as follows. Lot
P^ (X) be tne probabiii Ly that S =^ i, i = 0,---, 3, for nonunion workers,
given X. Then
3
7) E(:.iA} - Z ± r..(X)
; =0
Suppose that X is an eleiTient C;. '. . .'hen,
3X,
.^^
'
^'V,
is the effect of X on nonunion workers' einployment instability. Bv
estimating the model of sequential prohabilitic-s (q,, (X)
,
q-, (X)
,
q.^(X)),
th..; P^ (X) can be estimated, since:

9) PqCX) = q^(X)
10) P^(X) = q^(X)(l-q,j(X))
11) V.^m = q2(X)(l-qQ(X))(l-q^(X))
12) P^(X) = (l-q2(X))(l-q, (X))(i-q^,(X)).
y.rf ( O I Y~j
To estimate the partial derivatives
—hr^ , u = 1, . . . , M, a
u
two-step procedure is iieeded . First, the sequential probabilities q.(X)
are estifTiated. The logistic distribution is asBuiiied in estimaLing each
q.(X), Thus:
E a_j^^X^
-"•\
r. rv\ - e " u = 1, ..., M and
..) q.(X; -
—a:'Y- ' i = 0, 1, 2.
1+e - ^-^
^
Second, the raaxlinum likelihood estimates a^^ of the c-^^ are used in
*
' F /^ ^ 1 y ^ N ^. '^ ^
conjunction with equations 8-13 to estimate the r—
'
. Let s, q.i -nd i-' be
1 ax i ^
u
respectively the predicted values of s, q^, and P^, (n=0,...-3) associated with,
the a^^ and „X^ the mean of X. Then
^^ 3X 3 2u ^-2 ^4 - 3^ ^lu '=1
u
1 ^ J uu U
Calculation of the exact asymptotic standard errors for this point
estimate would be impossible because equation 17 involves products ol
functions of regression coefficients wliich are themselves correlated.
Instead, standard errors are approximated via the fcllovjing Taylor
expansion procedure. The right hand side of equation 14 contains terms
such as a_ q. . which can be apDroxiniated as:Ou u
'
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X is the mean rov vector of X and a^ and a.^ are respectively the true
and estimated column vectors of coefficients froni the equation esti-
aiating q„.
Thus
:
16) (a^^^ V^Ou '^0^^^~^-0u qo^^^^^'^^O*^^^^^ "^ ^^' •-, 0, q^CX) . . - . ,0] (a^-c..^j
where q^(X) in the second terra in brackets is placed in the same position
as a^^ is in a^. Hence,
Ou
17) a,~ q^ - oi,, a^CX) ~ t^' (a^, - c^) , where C' is the rov7 vector inUu '0 Uu U U
brackets on the right hand side of equation 16. A.n approximation to the
asymptotic variance of
.1^,.^ q , then, is C [ECCa^ - a^) (a^_ - c<.q)')]C,
'.v'here the term in brackets is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix
of a„, and a^ and q^(X) are replaced in C by a^ and q,, respectively.
If one assumes that the regression coefficients across equations are
. ^ ^ , - - . . £ SECSiX)independent, tnen ttie approximate asymptotic variance or —;;
—
7^~~ ^^'^
=i 12
be calculated througli repeated use of the Taylor expansion procedure.
It can thus be shown that
18) Asy... Var ^|i^ I d^' [ECCa^-^ ^^V-0> ' ^^0
u
+ d-, ' [E((a_^-a,^)(a^-a-,)')]d^ + d.; I E((a^-a2) (a^-a,) ' ) Id,,
d^ , d-, and d„ are column vectors and the terms in brackets are the
13
respective asymptotic variance-covarxance matrices oi a,., a,, ajid a..,.
The sequential logistic model is used (instead of, for example,
the ffiultinomial model) for the following reasons. First, because
separate functions are used to estimate q,. , q, and q.^ , the sequential
raodel allows for "state dependence" in estimating the probability of
staying at a given number of spells of unem.ployaient. For one's job

search and/or structure of jo'd offers are likely to ch;inge after each
spell of unemploymeac
.
Tf v/orkers at the bc:ginning of each year
planned their spells of unemployment for the y<^ii-r, then the rnultinor.iiai
iogit approach v;ould see-ii nppi-opriate. llov/ever, the seqiienclai approach
recognizes that workers do not have perfect tforesight s.ud can change
their plans. A second advantage of the sequential approach it; corapura-
tional simpj.icity: in sequential models, "'the likelihood fauction
[referring to all four probabilities P^-P„] can be maximi;:ed by niaxi-
mizing the likelihood of the dichotomous case repeatedly" (Ameralya,
15
1S75, p. 366). Third, although q^, q, and q^ in the sequential ffiodel
are assumed to be a-utually independent, equations 9-12 show that i'n~^3
16
are not Independent. Thus the sequentiaJ model appears to be no more
restrictive in its assuniptlons about the dependence of P/n-?o ^s the
multinoraial -nodel.
TV . Data
The vector X consists of observations on the following explanatory
variables for individuals in the tvelve standard metrcpoiiLan statistical
areas (SMSA's) covered by the SEO."'"'''
CONSTANT = 1 for ail respondents
ED = number of grades of school completed
KLT = 1 if health does not limit the kind or araount of v-'ork
one can do
= otherwise
K/\RRY = i if respondent is married with, spouse present
= othervise
KIDS = number of children

•1.0-
EX? - age - EO - 6 (piitc-nt iaJ cxperiencf.')
(EX?) " poteTitial experience squared
MIG = 1 if one h&d moved more than 50 mijea la tl'.e pi?«vioxis
five years
= otherwise
SOUTH = I if one lives in the south
= otherwise
SMSAUN'ION = percentage of priViite v^age and salary workivr^s ir. ov,c'^ ^
SMSA vho bc-J cng to unions; (in percti^Lrtge ooiat.!-: icr
1967)-^'^
SMSAUlNfEM = 1966 uneaiployment rate for the SMSA where ono lives
(ir, percentage points)
SMSi\flA>3U = 3 966 percentage of nonagriculcural e'eipioyiner.t lit the
ros])undenL 's SMSA that is in manufai^ruria.i: industrial
(in percer^Cage points)
SMSaRACE = J966 percentage of popsiliition in one's SMSA that
is r^onwiiite
Maximum likelihood estimates of the o.. . ar« obtsinird for each of fo'.ir
race-sex groups: nonwhl ce males, nniVAfliite females, white liiaies and
white females
.
ED, HLT, EXP, ^LARRY and KIUS hII represent Individual producciv J ry
cliaracteristlcs and/or constraints on one's labor supply. MIC is inciude^c
because the union crovding effect may cnuse otjt-mirjrat iori from highly
unionized areas. On the otiier hand, high union wages luc-.y c-rase in-
migration to highly unionized aroas (iiai] > i.97G) - In either ca^e, the
supply of labor in less-unloiiized labor market are-as jS affected by
actions of unions in highly organized areas. Our control for tni.'j
phenoaienon is similar to the conrrol for jnigratlon statu.*? in cross-
sectional studies of labor force parti cipati'.jn rates (Cain, 1967).

One might, suppose tliat: the .local iirienipioyn'>ent ratt- SMSAln^EM woisjd i.akv:
this factor iiiCo account; however, >ri!e for tixaiBpltr to inforifsat ion
problems, a recent nlgrariL TnialiC c'riaTige johii BorG isftt-n before XtndinjA
sn "appropriate" ono than an ci;ht;rvvi:^o idiir-ticiil pcrmanenr rasiot-nc
(Flanagarii 1974). Thureforo, voe havo coi^crclled ior ralgrarilon 'JH-'-.tua.
SOUTH, SMSAKACE, SM^SANHNEM and SfJBAMA?^li are Included i:c coatc^;2
for local labor rearket conditions bcriidefl invianirini. Oth^r rhingri
equal J higher SMSAliACK !« expected to csuse los:-: stable r.onwhlte eftiploy-
ment for two reasons. First, SKSaI^AC!-. npproxln>ares the degree of
crowding of minorities into low-peyinj^, nonuniea .'jobs th.'it i.s; act.
caused ])y ur.ion.-5 (iior^jmanii, 1971). Secoiid, the larger SM^JAi^ACE i;-,,
other r.hing.^ equal > '-ViO loor;; likely are uonwhiteK to find Jobs wii.h
diacrlmiiiatir-g rather t havi noadiseriniJriatirsjr; t-inployers (fsecker, 1957).
For either of these rcitscnSy oee wouid expe.;t uiirh 1 evel.s of SMSAP-ACE
to contribute (cete^ri.s P'^'^iJiH^^ -'^' "-ore rapid turnover for iioovhite
worker.9. If racial einploynvienc .'jegrejj.'ition xk pervasive (or was in
1366, the ye;3r for wtilch oor tiat.':, on .speJ.l.s of uneisployTiiOui. weure col leered
j
then white -workers in areuK with higi; v.-iJiji'S of SHSARACR face. l.-.-.6t.
competitior; than othon.v'i.'^^e. Therefore, one might expect white .'jjjell.s
o? uaemploynient: to be negatively rel.-ited to SMSATLACt: (other tlilagsj ecual)
.
On thio otlier haaci, whites in areas witii iiigli values oi i^MSAicAtJi'; rD.iy Siiive
better opportunltiei; th.:n otherwi'.se and quit riiorc oft*-n. Pisrtii.-'r , If
employers in Che nonunion sector viov; whites .-ind oonwhite.s ir: th.-at
sector as sub.9titutable, then :^ higher valee wf SMSA&7\Cr would le.-id,
to higher white as well is ncawhiu.- S. Thorefore the lisipact of SMSAilAi;!^
for whiLes is -mbiui-oxis.

-li'-
Gthor things equal, h:i};her valnc^B of. SHSAUNf'.'M ahould 3t-nd ro
higher nonunl-.m S (i;r loxver Jabor forr-.i^ partlcf.p.Tt.icn r.-"!i6s) "=1'' •-•'
corapi-cition for jobs. If iriar.-iif-'iciCuririj-, is a iii;-!j~w..'i-,:"- :>t>cEi>r., ilie:"!
nonunion worktirs in SMSA's yfith large valutas cf SMSAMANU aay very w^.-l 1.
quit more ofti-s> than ochei-wl^je . This ourcotno is sl-iJiJ^t to the fJiiu
in Mincer's (.1.976) min-iKiunj w-iige inodel.
Finally, the coefficlirnts fo;: S>;BAl)NiON represetit dU: elfc-cL of
.•3 union e^nviron-rjenr. on cbe lob ins'LabiJ -ity oT n;.;riLit:tOi;! work<2rfr. Far
re'ison.s: stated shove, clie coef .-rici^inC for f-his varlohlo la trxpc-cLtid
Lo be larger for nonwhite tltnn for wlsicc- -st-ii :iad larj-^f;}" fiir lioiiwhlr^
than tvvr yhitti vojKt-n. From tiie ii.-!riii;r di/u-ussion, "fie ni.i.v;!;!: ex:>£--:;t
the Bp£li.a uf av-y ract^-sGX groiip i:o depend ou the ci^grf'^s oi; unlariian:
of each raee-nex group. I:- priiselpic, i;!;«n, in the tritiwition tor
u:ich i5ubgroiip osh:! ti>xgh,t ur^r- chr- foor vnjues of SMSAliNXON iin i^/^p.hinni-ary
variableft. Howviver, because Lhe SEO sa'nple contiiXns only cwi-ivo SM3A'«.
arsd biiCiiLisc the rankings of SMSAfil^TON by race-sex crc,-^!.-. ucco^e. SMSa's
are e>:trei«e.lv eoiisistciov. , such a p-rocediirc- is not fC'irj.rh Ut."
'
Becaiise SMSAl/NIDN and SMSA^JNEM are b->tli l.n ].rlncipl<j c^ndoiiefioan
Lo our nioclai
,
possible hlasiiii ar35;ii in th<^ csJiiiuation of: tha riffect oi
tinions on n<Jniifiion emp Inyintent stal;iiii.y. i'lrst, if vuilons are becter
aiil!^ no organise sJ:;;hlG ch:)n iin^^tiabj.e worki-rs, then SMSA's viui iilr:>!
vaiisoH of S are J.ess likejy Co hf-co:nc- highly u-.iioai'.-ed .' Isi this
c.asi-., a negacivo si^!nl;:'*!i<?ity ;n;iK i.s iir!p.i.rt;i:-'i ic the f-ffoc!: of orrior;.'^
oil rionunion offiplnymirat instaiil") iLy . ' Slacr indli^.lr,^Sa.l .-OMp'.i^•tr icii in
probably a nirjor deiej-niinant; ijf SMSAUNION, tiie contrcA for SMSAMANl: ai.
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least partially corrects for factors that influence the degree of
unionism. It is possible that high wages in an SMSA lead to a high
degree of unionism and to search unemployment, producing a positive
bias on SMSAUNION (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972) . However, the
strength of such a bias is at least in part discounted by Kahn's
(1976) result that high degrees of unionism, ceteris paribus , led to
lower real wages for nonwhite male and white female nonunionists.
Second, the unemployment rate of an area is in part determined by
23
the crowding effect of unions. Inclusion of SMSAUNEM, then, appears
to be another source of downward bias on the SMSAUNION coefficient
because part of unionism's effect on the S of nonunion workers operates
through unemployment. SMSAUNEM is included to account for exogenous
factors (such as age composition of the labor force and detailed
Industrial composition) that influence an area's unemployment rate.
Since the sources of possible bias mentioned here are largely negative,
24
our confidence in a positive union effect on S would be strengthened.
V. Empirical Results
Appendix 3 summarizes the results by race-sex group for the
25
sequential probabilities q^, q-j^ and q^- Table 1 presents estimates
and approximate asymptotic standard errors for the impact of each
26
explanatory variable on spells of unemployment.
The coefficients for SMSAUNION in Table 1 measure the estimated
impact on S of a one percentage point change in SMSAUNION. In the SEO
sample, this variable ranges from 10% to 46%. A conservative estimate,
then, of the difference in unionism between a highly unionized SMSA
.i'rsiiAM v:j ns30uo:..iJ:i
-i)3ir?
fg-tno
-ju
n'
r v e. //I
aocfrft
,nsrtj
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Table 1^: Estimates of ^^^^f.^J^^) by Race-Sex Group9X
Race-Sex Group
Independent
variable
ED
EXP
(EXP)'
MIG
HLT
SMSAUNEM
SMSAUNION
SMSARACE
SMSAMANU
SOUTH
KIDS
Nonwhi te
males
-.029
(.009)
.001
(.007)
-.0001
(.0002)
.061
(.065)
-.062
(.097)
.154
(.072)
.009
(.0059)
.023
(.015)
-.003
(.005)
.267
(.139)
Nonwhi te
females
White
males
White
females
-.012
(.009)
-.021
(.003)
-.013
(.004)
-.013
(.006)
-.009
(.002)
-.007
(.003)
.0002
(.0001)
.0002
(.0001)
.00009
(.00005)
.002
(.054)
.068
(.022)
.019
(.024)
.003
(.069)
-.030
(.034)
-.034
(.027)
-.012
(.048)
.005
(.020)
.010
(.023)
.0073
(.0038)
.0009
(.002)
-.0004
(.002)
-.018
(.010)
-.003
(.004)
-.009
(.006)
-.0009
(.003)
-.0002
(.002)
-.003
(.002)
.217
(.101)
-.066
(.080)
.094
(.071)
-.004
(.011) .
—
.006
(.007)
'^Approximate asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Mean
values of the independent variables were used in the calcu-
lations.
<.'.'
U)
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and a relatively non-unionized SMSA would be 20 percentage points.
Table 2 illustrates the impact on spells of unemployment of such a
difference in unionism.
Table 2: Percentage Impact of a 20 Percentage Point Change
in SMSAUNION on E(s|x) (Ceteris paribus)
Race-Sex Group Union Effect
Nonwhite males 63.0%
Nonwhite females 69.4%
White males 17.3%
White females ~8.5%
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the degree of unionism strongly
increases the expected spells of unemployment for nonwhite males and
females. For these groups the point estimates are large and sizable
compared to their standard errors. These results are in principle
strengthened by the discussion of downward biases in Section IV
27
above
.
In assessing the impact of unionism on racial differentials in
28
nonunion spells of unemployment one can pose the following questions.
First, if nonwhites' and whites' spells of unemployment were equally
affected by unionism, what impact would there be on these differentials?
Such a comparison is analogous to the coefficient effect in decomposing
racial wage differentials (Flanagan, 1974). Second, if nonwhites had
both the white coefficients for SMSAUNION and the white mean SMSAUNION,
29
what would racial differentials in spells be?
;.^nrr..
^tfXiiifl
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Table 3 illustrates the overall differences by race and sex In
average spells of unemployment.
Table 3*: Average Number of Spells of Unemployment for
Nonunion Workers, 1966
Race-Sex Group Mean Spells Predicted Spells**
Nonwhite males
Nonwhite females
White males
White females
.286
.259
.104
.094
.290
.209
.102
.089
*Source: 1967 SEC Tape.
**A11 explanatory variables are assumed to equal their
mean values
.
Table 4 presents the hypothetical nonwhite spells of unemploy-
ment under the assumptions of the two questions posed above.
Table 4: Hypothetical Nonwhite Spells of Unemployment
E(S X) with E(S X) with
White White Mean and
SMSAUNION Coefficient for
Group Coefficient SMSAUNION
Nonwhite males .160 .141
Nonwhite females .157 .159
Table 4 illustrates that if nonwhites responded to unionism in
the same way as whites, then the race differentials in spells would
be substantially reduced 30 The mechanism by which the differentials
would be reduced is not entirely clear: unionism leads to spells of
• dW
unemployment via k, 6, W, -^ and liquidity considerations. However,
•> •.• -..•„
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one can conclude that if these factors were equal for whites and non-
whites within sex groups, then race differentials in the incidence of
unemployment would be greatly reduced.
VI. Conclusions
The major result obtained here has been the strong negative effect
of unions on the employment stability of nonunion nonahite workers. This
finding is consistent with Hall's (1970) view of high rates of nonwhite
unemployment at 'full employment':
The true problem of hard-core unemployment is that
certain members of the Icbor force account for a
disproportionate share of unemplojnnent because
they drift from one unsatisfactory job to another,
spending the time between jobs either unemployed
or out of the labor force (Hall, 1970, p. 389).
Further, this paper has employed a technique that has many poten-
tial applications to situations involving sequential choice.
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Footnotes
1. Unions can in principle have opposing effects on the wages and
working conditions of nonunion workers. On the one hand, if
unions raise their members' wages, less labor is hired in the
union sector than would otherwise be the case. Workers may
then crowd into the nonunion sector, leading to lower wages
and worse working conditions there (the "crowding effect").
On the other hand, union gains may compel employers of non-
union labor to raise wages and improve working conditions in
order to keep unions out or to reduce turnover (the "threat
effect"). At any time, each of these two effects may co-
exist in the labor market. In an earlier paper, the net
effect of unions on the wages of nonunion workers in rela-
tively unorganized sectors was investigated (Kahn, 1976). It
was found that unions lowered the real wages of nonunion white
females and nonwhite males and raised those of white males.
2. In a steady state sense, the unemployment rate equals fre-
quency times duration.
3. In reality, unions are more likely to arise in high wage
industries (see Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972 or Kahn,
forthcoming) . By assuming that preunionization wages were
W for all workers, this model assesses the impact of a union-
caused wage differential on nonunion employment stability.
Most single equation studies of union impact indeed found that
unions raised their members' relative wages (see Ashenfelter
and Johnson, 1972). When unionism is viewed as endogenous,
the results are mixed. In the one hand, Ashenfelter and John-
son (1972) and Schmidt and Strauss (1976) could not reject
the hypothesis that unions do not raise relative wages. On
the other hand, when changes in technique of production and
labor quality were allowed, Kahn (forthcoming) was able to
reject the null hypothesis of no union impact.
4. Caused, say, by a change in labor laws.
5. Hendricks (1975) indeed found that union wages in an industry
were positively affected by the degree of unionism in the
industry and in the labor market as a whole. Rosen (1969) and
Stafford (1968) found that the union-nonunion differential in
an industry rose as the degree of unionism in the industry rose.
6. It can be shown that the qualitative result stated here holds
in the cases of fixed or variable labor force size (Miner, 1976),
7. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) found that the nonunion sector
is more competitive than the union sector. Thus higher firm
mortality rates imply that nonunion workers are more likely
to lose their jobs.
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8. See Lippman and McCall (1976) for a discussion of job search
models in which the possibility of bankruptcy forces a searcher's
reservation wage downward as search time increases
.
9. Such would be the case if race-sex groups perceive the labor
market to be segmented by race and/or sex.
10. In this case, for example, a rise in W for nonwhite males
affects all the subgroups equally.
11. To see that expression 15 holds, consider the following expan-
sion around a :
9(aou^O^
ag
9a, I -0 ^^0"''o) = °'0u^0 + ^O^^Ou-^Ou^
ag
+ q^(l-qQ)X(a^a^) , where q_ is evaluated at X.
12. The assumption of the independence of a_, a^ and a_ is discussed
below.
13. See Appendix 1 for a derivation of expression 18.
14. Heckman and Willis (1977), in a model of female labor force
participation, suggest that heterogeneity of the sample (not
accounted for by the explanatory variables) can cause an apparent
state dependence of transition probabilities, even though the
underlying model predicts state independence. It is argued here
that even for identical individuals, the probability of say,
moving from one to two spells of unemployment may differ from
the probability of moving from two to three spells
.
15. One might suppose that the following ordered response model
would apply to our case (this discussion follows that of
Amemiya, 1975). Suppose one can be unemployed 0, 1 or 2 times
and that the expected nimiber of spells is a function of a single
variable z. Individual i becomes unemployed twice if u < z
and at least once if u -c<z ,. for u , a tandom variable and c,
a positive constant. If u is distributed as logistic, then we
have:
P (S=2) = L (z)
P (S=l or 2) = L (z+c)
P (S=0) = L (-Z-C) , where L (-) is the logistic distribution
function. This ordered response model is not used here because
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the assumption of the constant shift parameter, c, is too
restrictive. In equations 9-12 above, no particular restric-
tions are placed, for example, on the difference between
P(S=1) and P(S^l). In addition, according to Amemiya,
If one uses an ordered model when the true model
is unordered, one could get into serious trouble,
whereas the loss in using an unordered model in
the ordered situation is only in efficiency
since consistent estimates are still obtained
(Amemiya, 1975, p. 366).
16. In principle, the errors in the sequential probability functions
are correlated across equations. For example, the random factors
(personality, etc.) that make one unlikely to experience zero
spells of unemployment may also decrease the probability of hav-
ing only one spell. However, the three probability functions
corresponding to q_, q^ and q^ are not all estimated from the
same sample. There is, therefore, no obvious way within the
sequential logistic model of taking into account the across-
equation error structure.
17. See Appendix 2 for derivations and sample mean values for X.
218. Equation 3) above implies that k should be an explanatory
variable (because '^^a is a function of k) • However, equation
"dTT
3) refers to overall unemployment, not to spells of unemploy-
ment. The functional form of the relationship between spells
and k is not intuitively obvious. Therefore, for reasons of
computational ease, we have not included an SMSAUNION squared
term in X.
19. Migrants may also have different productivity characteristics
from nonmigrants (e.g., the former may be more aspiring).
The MIG coefficients do not measure the impact of migrating;
instead they compare the respective probabilities of "stopping"
at 0, 1 or 2 spells of unemployment (ceteris paribus ) of recent
migrants to those of nonmigrants in the SMSA to which the
former have migrated.
20. If such turnover results in decreased labor force participa-
tion rates, then S (the number of spells of unemployment)
under-states the impact of SMSARACE on employment stability.
21. The controls for SMSAUNEM, SMSARACE and SMSAMANU leave us
with essentially eight degrees of freedom. SMSAUNION for the
whole market is used, rather than that for the particular sub-
group being considered, because this is the more general
specification. That is, for example, the unionism of each race-
sex group affects nonwhite males by influencing the total
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SMSAUNION. In addition, since it was argued above that illiquidlty
led to higher S, it would have been interesting to use family
income and assets as explanatory variables. However, these were
not available on the SEO tape we used.
22. In the long run, the "typical" nonunion worker may have a greater
or smaller propensity to be stable than the average union worker
in the same SMSA. On the one hand, unions are ceteris paribus
more likely to recruit in industries with stable employees, and
union-won benefits may increase that stability. On the other
hand, Mincer's model implies that the least risk averse workers
are most likely to apply to union firms for jobs. These employees
may well be more unstable than more risk averse workers. Thus,
there is little reason to believe that unions will lower the
average propensity of nonunion workers to be stable. Instead,
it is argued here that unions' effect on the environment of non-
union workers leads to increased stability.
23. Industrial composition also affects an area's unemployment rate:
for example, areas with seasonal industries should, other things
equal, have higher unemployment rates than otherwise.
24. Notice that intervening variables such as average union or non-
union wages are not included as explanatory variables. This is
the case because one is interested in the ultimate impact of
personal characteristics and labor market variables on nonunion
employment stability. In particular, SMSAUNION may directly
and/or Indirectly (through union wages, nonunion wages, etc.)
influence the dependent variable. This forraulation allows
estimation of the direct plus indirect effects of unionism
on spells of unemployment. In addition, the assignment of S=3
to those with more than three spells of unemployment further
understates the union impact on spells. It is more likely,
other things equal, that nonunion workers with S=3 in highly
unionized SMSA's have more than three spells than those with
S=3 in nonunionlzed SMSA's.
25. Because of the nature of the computer program used to estimate
the q
,
, the predicted probabilities q, are computed as follows:
2Za. .X.
q_ = .S—
J
__ i = 0,1,2 and j =1, ..., 13,
'
1+e 'l^ih
where the a-, are the reported maximum likelihood estimates.
26. In Table A. 3.1. in the estimation of q^ for white males and
white females, there are some empty cells (SOUTH for white
males and SOUTH and HLT for white females) . In the calcula-
tions of Table !» it is assumed that the coefficients for these
variables are and that the covariances between these coeffi-
cients and others are 0. This problem could have been avoided
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for these two groups by restricing S to the values 0, 1 and 2
(the last value refers to "2 or more" spells) . When this
procedure is used, the results are qualitatively unchanged.
27. The standard errors on the local labor market variable coeffi-
cients (including SMSAUNION) might well have been smaller if
the SEO sample had included more than 12 SMSA's.
28. We concentrate on race differences because, as will be seen, sex
differences in spells are not large and because the functional
forms used here differ by sex. The data do not permit an esti-
mate of the hypothetical differentials in spells when SMSAUNION =
because this value is outside of the range for our sample.
29. White coefficients and means are used as benchmarks because whites
are a majority of the labor force.
30. The effect of the white mean is to further lower the predicted
spells of nonwhite males but not to noticeably affect that of
nonwhite females
.
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(^F ( ^ 1 X^
Appendix 1: Approximation of the Asymptotic Variance of ——
r
f^F CS I X^
Equation 14 gives an expression for —^rjH
—
-. Using expressions
14 and 15, one can write the following approximation:
Ai n. aE(s|x) 9E(Six) .
^^i^^' 3Xy " 3Xu ~
^3 "^2 f^Ou ^0 "* ^u ^1 + ^2u (2q2-l)] X (a2 - a^)
+ q^ [(P2 + 2P3) q^ a^^ + (P^ + 2P3) (2q^-l) a^^ + P3 q^ a^J X (a^ - a^
+ io ^^h + 2P2 + 3P3)(2qo-l) a^^ 4- (P^ + 2P3) q^ a^^ + P3 ^^^ a^J X (a^ - a^)
- P3 q2 (a^^ - a^^)
- (P2 + 2P3) q^ (a^^ - a^^)
- (P^ + 2P2 + 3P3) qg (a^^ - a^^)
.
Under the assumption of independence across equations of the logit
coefficients, expression Al.l allows one to approximate the asymptotic
^
8E(S|X)
• J u -10varxance of —rrr'
—
, as summarized by expression 18.
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Appendix 2: Description of the Data
This appendix describes the sources and derivations of several of
the variables used in this study.
EXP: Potential experience is constrained to be nonnegative and
to begin at age 16.
SOUTH: In this study, Houston is taken to be in the South, but
Baltimore and Washington, D.C. (considered Southern SMSA's by the
Census) are not. One usually controls for Southern residence to take
into account the following factors: cost of living, rural residence,
industrial structure, degree of unionism and degree of racism. Con-
trolling for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th factor (as this study does), we
believe that Baltimore and Washington, D.C. are more similar in labor
market structure to the other SMSA's of the SEO than these two SMSA's
are to Houston. Cost of living is not directly relevant to this study.
SMSAUNION: This variable was calculated from the SEO.
SMSAUNEM: This variable was taken from Hall (1970).
SMSAl'lANU: This variable was calculated from USBLS (1966).
SMSARACE: This variable was constructed via an interpolation
of data from 1960 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960) and 1970 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970) . Total and nonwhite population were assumed
to have grown at constant rates from 1960 to 1970.
Mean Values of Independent Variables
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Variable females females males males
ED 11.6637 10.1634 12.1288 9.76583
EXP 18.9576 21.4630 18.3826 19.0299
(EXP)
2
562.100 637.282 575.658 534.194
MIG .169462 .129377 .214519 .189964
HLT .940865 .89786 .93002 .929510
SMSAUNEM 3.71253 3.34805 3.6416 3.29785
SMSAUNION 31.0159 28.2646 30.2479 26.9391
SMSARACE 15.5628 17.8873 15.7494 18.1072
SMSAMANU 27.9537 26.2482 28.4519 25.3978
SOUTH .0317741 .0875486 .0477436 .111111
KIDS 1.26567 1.86673 —
—
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Appendlx 3: Empirical Results for the Sequential Probabilities
Table A. 3.1. Logit Results for Sequential Probabilities
Nonwhite Males
Independent Variables
Sequential Probabilities
Constant
ED
EXP
(EXP)^
MIG
HLT
SMSAUNEM
SMSAUNION
SMSARACE
SMSAMANU
SOUTH
KIDS^
0.8036 3.9489 6.6531
(1.0433) (2.2784) (4.5140)
0.0503 0.0376 -0.0020
(0.0162) (0.0382) (0.0575)
0.0081 -0.0468 0.0306
(0.0128) (0.0261) (0.0437)
0.0002 0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0010)
-0.1612 0.0984 0.1404
(0.1158) (0.2253) (0.3572)
0.2628 -0.2579 -0.9139
(0.1706) (0.3549) (0.5594)
-0.1097 -0.4989 -1.0076
(0.1214) (0.2757) (0.5706)
-0.0093 -0,.0298 -0.0198
(0.0103) (0.0210) (0.0328)
-0.0162 -0.0857 -0.1202
(0.0263) (0.0558) (0.1098)
0.0010 .0.0205 -0.0045
(0.O080) (0.0167) (0.0247)
-0.2321 -0.9058 -0.9958
(0.2432) (0.5035) (0.8310)
837 139
Asymptotic Standard errors in parentheses;
n = no. of observations
This variable was unavailable for males.
69
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Table A. 3.1. (Continued)
TJnnwhlte Females
Independent Variables
_SeauentialJProbaMUties_
Constant
ED
EXP
(EXP)^
MIG
HLT
SMSAUNEM
SMSAUTJilON
SMSARACE
SMSAI^ANU
SOUTH
KIDS
^0
0.3360
(0.8949)
0.0225
(0.0203)
0.0299
(0.0132)
-0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.0063
(0.1293)
0.0122
(0.1629)
-0.0013
(0.1062)
0.0013
(0.0089)
0.0084
(0.0216)
-0.0112
(0.0077)
-0.1159
(0.2375)
-0.0054
(0.0237)
-0.9849
(2.112)
0.0236
(0.0509)
0.0120
(0.0301)
-0.0006
(0.0007)
-0.0172
(0.2599)
-0.0087
(0.3373)
0.0499
(0.2556)
-0.0684
(0.0193)
0.0966
(0.0525)
0,0436
(0.0192)
-1.51^1
(0.5032)
0.0410
(Q.0588)
-5.449
(4.7061)
0.0632
(0.0790)
0.0391
(0.0482)
-0.0012
(0.0011)
0.0719
(0.3966)
-0.2250
(0.5477)
0.2792
(0.5226)
-n.0507
(0.0328)
0.2364
(0.1447)
0.0338
(0.0349)
-1.2729
(1.0411)
0.0870
(0.1039)
1028 146
63

-27-
Table A. 3.1. (Continued)
White Males
Independent Variables
Sequential Probabilities
"^0 ^1 ^2
-0.3167 -0.8752 -0.7562
(0.8603) (1.6407) (3.1057)
0.0869 0.0777 0.1128
(0.0139) (0.0316) (0.0725)
0.0508 -0.0239 0.0796
(0.0114) (0.0246) (0.0567)
-0.0008 0.0005 -0.0022
(0,0003) (0.0006) (0.0015)
-0.3100 -0.1573 -0.1672
(0.1047) (0.2129) (0.3800)
0.2681 -0.1909 -1.1312
(0.1593) (0.3218) (0.6027)
-0.0793 0.1444 0.3514
(0.0924) (0.1785) (0.3304)
-0.0063 0.0118 -0.0233
(0.0089) (0.0183) (0.0282)
0.0164 -0.0000 -0.0369
(0.0203) (0.0365) (0.0605)
0.0033 -0.0087 -.0019
(0.0084) (0.0170) (0.0335)
0.2057 0.5664 c
(0.3759) (0.7766)
Constant
ED
EXP
(EXP)'
MIG
HLT
SMSAUNEM
SMSAUNION
SMSARACE
SMSAMANU
SOUTH
KIDS
n 1529 136 51
'In estimating q„, all white males had SOUTH = 0.
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Table A. 3.1. (Continued)
White Females
SequenLtlal Probabilities
Independent Variables
^0 "il ^2
Constant
0.6627
(0.83A7)
-4.1307
(4.4422)
-33.3998
(29.5699)
ED
0.0507
(0.0182)
0.1345
(0.0661)
0.1070
(0.1790)
EXP
0.0464
(0.0124)
-0.0345
(0.0397)
0.0193
(0.1060)
(EXP)^
-0.0007
(0.0003)
0.0008
(0.0009)
0.0001
(0.0022)
MIG
-0.1164
(0.1253)
-0.1939
(0.3473)
0.9321
(0.9387)
HLT
0.1611
(0.1609)
0.2744
(0.5157)
d
SMSAUNEM
-0.1838
(0.0902)
0.2107
(0.3949)
2.5594
(2.4719)
SMSAUNION
-0.0029
(0.0083)
0.0259
(0.0346)
0.0204
(0.0528)
SMSARACE
0.0181
(0.0180)
0.0164
(0.0953)
0.9708
(0.8307)
SMSAMANU
-0.0010
(0.0072)
0.0462
(0.0391)
0.2529
(0.2275)
SOUTH
-0.7141
(0.3689)
0.8649
(1.2248)
d
KIDS
-0.0438
(0.0387)
0.1289
(0.1206)
-0.3318
(0.3321)
n 1133 96 20
In estimating q,, all white females had HLT = 1 and SOUTH = 0.
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